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ZONING ADULT ESTABLISHMENTS IN NEW
YORK: A DEFENSE OF THE ADULT-USE
ZONING TEXT AMENDMENTS OF 1995
James E. Berger*
Introduction
On October 25, 1995, the New York City Council approved a
series of amendments to the Zoning Resolution of the City of New
York to regulate adult entertainment establishments (the "adult-
use amendments").' Although many municipalities nationwide
have sought to regulate the location of adult entertainment estab-
lishments (such as topless and nude bars, adult video and book
stores, and adult theaters and peep shows), these amendments rep-
resent New York City's first attempt to regulate adult-uses through
specific zoning provisions.2 Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani and the
New York City Council proposed the adult-use amendments in re-
sponse to the dramatic proliferation of adult entertainment estab-
lishments throughout New York City in the last ten years. The goal
of the proposal was to limit the adverse secondary impacts of adult
establishments while safeguarding the constitutionally protected
rights to provide and procure adult-oriented goods and services.
The adult-use amendments were submitted for formal public re-
view pursuant to Sections 200 and 201 of the New York City Char-
ter on March 22, 1995. During the seven months that followed, the
city's fifty-nine community boards, five borough boards and bor-
ough presidents, the City Planning Commission, and the City
* Former Counsel, Office of City Legislative Affairs, Office of the Mayor, New
York, New York. B.A., George Washington University, 1989; J.D., Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law, 1993. Mr. Berger worked with the New York City Department of
City Planning, Department of Buildings, Law Department, and Council in developing
the adult-use amendments, and represented the Office of the Mayor before the Coun-
cil during the deliberations preceding their enactment.
1. See New York City Council Res. No. 1322 (1995) (amending New York, N.Y.
Zoning Resolution §§ 12-10, 32-00, 32-01, 32-62, 32-69, 42-00, 42-01, 42-52, 42-55, 51-
00, 52-38, 52-71, 52-734, 52-77, 52-82, 72-01, and 72-40 (1961)) [hereinafter Council
Res. No. 1322].
2. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, ADULT ENTERTAINMENT
STUDY i (1994) [hereinafter DCP STUDY].
3. See NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, REPORT No. N 950384 1, Cal.
No. 8 (Sept. 18, 1995) [hereinafter CPC REPORT].
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Council reviewed the amendments.' Over the course of these re-
views, three distinct lines of opposition emerged. The first group of
opponents objected to the adult-use amendments on the ground
that they would result in a considerable influx of adult establish-
ments into their communities because of their displacement from
existing locations. The second group believed that the amend-
ments did not go far enough to protect communities. Proponents of
this view generally advocated even more restrictive provisions or
an outright ban on adult entertainment establishments. The third
group felt that the adult-use amendments were overly restrictive
and violative of constitutional free speech guarantees.'
All but the last of these objections were resolved conclusively
through the political process, as both the City Planning Commis-
sion and City Council voted to approve the adult-use amend-
ments.6 However, the final objection, concerning the validity of
the adult-use amendments under the United States and New York
Constitutions, will have to be resolved in the courts. Indeed, on
February 27, 1996, the New York Civil Liberties Union (the New
York State chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union) filed
suit in Supreme Court, New York County, alleging that the adult-
use amendments violated the Constitutions of the United States
and the State of New York.7
In a Note published in this journal, Rachel Simon argued that
the adult-use amendments suffered from two fundamental flaws
that undermined their ability to withstand judicial review. First,
Ms. Simon suggested that the adult-use amendments would reduce
the number of adult-use establishments in New York City, and that
any ordinance that causes such a reduction is constitutionally sus-
pect. Second, she maintains that the adult-use amendments' inclu-
4. See New York, N.Y. Charter § 201 (public review process for zoning text
amendments); see also New York, N.Y. Charter § 197-C (detailing the public review
procedure for uniform land use).
5. CPC REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-15 (summarizing resolutions of community
boards, borough .boards, and borough presidents).
6. The City Planning Commission voted to approve the amendments by a vote of
seven to six, see CPC REPORT, supra note 3, at 78, while the Council voted to approve
by a vote of forty-one to nine.
7. See Amsterdam Video, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 103568/96 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co. filed Feb. 27, 1996); Hickerson v. City of New York, No. 103567/96 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co. filed Feb. 27, 1996); Stringfellow's, Ltd. v. City of New York, No. 103567/96 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Co. filed July 22, 1996); see also Thomas J. Lueck, Sex Shops and Patrons
Join in Suits Challenging Zoning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996 at B1.
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sion of topless bars has no empirical basis in the record, thus
rendering the amendments 0verbroad.8
This Article limits its scope to a discussion of whether the adult-
use amendments comply with federal and state constitutional re-
quirements, and addresses the specific arguments put forth by Ms.
Simon. Part I of this article examines the adult entertainment in-
dustry in New York City. Part II summarizes the findings con-
tained in the study of adult entertainment impacts completed. by
the New York City Department of City Planning in 1993 and out-
lines the provisions of the adult-use amendments. Part III dis-
cusses the federal and state constitutional provisions protecting
adult entertainment establishments. Part IV concludes that the
adult-use amendments are consistent, with both federal and state
constitutional requirements, and that the adult-use amendments
will survive judicial scrutiny.
I. The Adult Entertainment Industry in New York City
In 1965, there were only nine adult entertainment establishments
in New York City, largely because state and local obscenity laws
imposed severe restrictions on the sale and distribution of porno-
graphic material. 9 By 1976, however, these restrictions had largely
been repealed, 10 and the number of adult establishments increased
to 151. Following a decrease between 1976 and 1984, the number
rose again to an all-time high of 177 adult entertainment establish-
ments in 1993.
A. The Nature of the Adult-Use Industry in New York
Sexually-oriented, or "adult," entertainment constitutes a multi-
billion dollar industry encompassing a wide array of goods, serv-
ices, and activities." Recent developments within the industry in-
clude a marked increase in the use of telecommunications media
(such as the internet and telephone toll lines) for adult purposes,
and a decrease in the number of adult motion picture theaters.12
From a land use and zoning perspective, however, two trends are
most noteworthy-the dramatic increase in the sale and rental of
8. See Rachel Simon, Note, New York City's Restrictive Zoning of Adult Busi-
nesses: A Constitutional Analysis, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187 (1995).
9. DCP STUDY, supra note 2, at 19.
10. See, e.g., 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 989 (refining definition of obscenity to conform
to standards established in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1974)).
11. DCP STUDY, supra note 2, at 15.
12. Id
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adult videos, and the increased popularity of topless bars and clubs.
These latter types of uses, together with more "traditional" adult
entertainment establishments such as peep shows and adult thea-
ters, have been the focus of attempts to regulate the adult en-
tertainment industry through zoning.
1. Industry Trends
Technological advances and decreased production costs have
caused the video segment of the adult entertainment industry to
grow considerably in recent years. An industry source reported
that adult video sales and rentals from general-interest video stores
have increased by seventy-five percent since 1991, totalling approx-
imately $2.1 billion nationwide. 13 This increased popularity and
the lower cost of adult videos has also spurred a rapid increase in
the number of adult-only video stores, which have located in resi-
dential areas of New York City that had not historically been home
to adult entertainment uses.'4 In 1993, there were eighty-six adult
book, video, and peep show establishments in New York City, an
increase of 197 percent since 1984.15
Topless entertainment constitutes another growing segment of
the adult-use industry, accounting for approximately $50 million in
business annually in New York City. 6 Some newer topless clubs
have marketed themselves to a more affluent consumer base, and
have attempted to shed the unseemly image associated with strip
clubs and topless bars by attempting to operate as more main-
stream establishments offering amenities found in non-adult bars
and clubs (such as giant screen televisions and pool tables).' 7 Like
adult video stores, these clubs have proliferated in local commer-
cial strips adjacent to residential areas. In 1993, there were sixty-
eight topless and nude bars in New York City, an increase of
twenty-six percent.' 8
2. Locational Trends
Historically, the adult entertainment industry was concentrated
in the Times Square and West 42nd Street areas of Midtown Man-
hattan. While Midtown continues to have the highest concentra-
13. DCP STUDY, supra note 2, at 15.
14. Id. at 18.
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id.
18. DCP STUDY, supra note 2, at 22.
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tion of adult entertainment establishments, 19 concentrations of
adult businesses have appeared in the outer boroughs since 1984.
Specifically, while the number of community districts with at least
one adult business has remained stable over the 1984-1993 period,
the number of districts with seven or more adult businesses nearly
tripled over the same period, from three to eight.20 This prolifera-
tion of adult uses in new areas is likely attributable to the techno-
logical changes discussed above and the shift within the industry
away from adult theaters to smaller establishments (such as video
and book stores) that require less capital and can be started and
managed by a single entrepreneur.
II. The DCP Study and the Adult-Use Amendments
Prompted by growing concern about the increase in the number
of adult businesses and their proliferation into previously unaf-
fected communities, the Department of City Planning undertook a
study of the impacts of adult businesses on urban life (the "DCP
Study"). This study, published in 1994, provided the empirical
foundation for the adult-use amendments. The findings set forth in
the study, as well as the provisions of the adult-use amendments,
are summarized below.
A. The DCP Study
The DCP Study offered a two-tiered analysis. The first part of
the study discussed the impacts of adult entertainment establish-
ments identified in other jurisdictions. The second part discussed
previous studies of these establishments in New York City, and an-
alyzed data compiled independently from a number of study and
control areas around the city.
1. Studies and Regulations in Other Jurisdictions
The DCP Study first analyzed data concerning adult-use impacts
identified in the following nine jurisdictions: Islip, New York; Los
Angeles, California; Indianapolis, Indiana; Whittier, California;
19. Id. at 23. Manhattan Community District Five, which includes part of the
Tunes Square area, has the highest concentration of adult uses in the city, with 53.
The adjacent district, Community District Four, ranks second with 19 adult uses. Id.
The concentration of adult uses along 42nd Street has been broken, however, by an
ongoing redevelopment initiative sponsored by the Empire State Development Cor-
poration (formerly the New York State Urban Development Corporation), pursuant
to which a number of adult establishments were taken into public ownership through
the state's power of condemnation. Id. at 36-37.
20. Id. at 23.
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Austin, Texas; Phoenix, Arizona; Manatee County, Florida; New
Hanover County, North Carolina; and the State of Minnesota. The
studies in these jurisdictions included the following findings:
* Islip: Concentrations of adult entertainment uses give rise to
"dead zones" avoided by shoppers and pedestrians;
2
'
* Los Angeles: Areas with concentrations of adult entertain-
ment uses have higher rates of certain crimes; concentrations of
adult entertainment uses have an adverse impact on the value of
nearby commercial and residential properties;
22
* Indianapolis: Major crimes occurred in areas with at least one
adult entertainment use at rate significantly higher than in control
areas and the city as a whole; adult-use establishment located in
middle-income residential or commercial area would have an ad-
verse impact on property values;23
* Whittier: Commercial and residential areas adjacent to adult
uses had higher turnover rates; a study area containing adult en-
tertainment uses had much higher increases in crime than the city
as a whole; adult uses are associated with excessive noise, drunken-
ness, and pornographic litter;24
* Austin and Phoenix: A direct positive correlation existed be-
tween the number of adult entertainment establishments and the
rate of sex-related crime;2 5
* Minnesota: Areas with concentrations of adult entertainment
uses showed a statistically significant positive relationship between
adult entertainment uses, crime, and neighborhood blight.2 6
The DCP Study also summarized the findings of other munici-
palities that relied exclusively on studies from other jurisdictions to
conclude that adult entertainment establishments resulted in nega-
tive secondary impacts, such as increased crime rates, decreased
property values, and deterioration in the quality of life and overall
character of communities.27 The DCP Study concluded that data
from the jurisdictions discussed above provided ample evidence
that adult entertainment establishments have adverse negative sec-
ondary impacts on adjacent communities.28
21. DCP STUDY, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing Islip study).
22. Id. at 4 (discussing Los Angeles study).
23. Id. at 5 (discussing Indianapolis study).
24. Id. at 6 (discussing Whittier study).
25. DCP STUDY, supra note 2, at 6-7 (discussing Phoenix and Austin studies).
26. Id. at 8 (discussing Minnesota study).
27. Id. at 67-68.
28. DCP STUDY, supra note 2, at 67.
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Furthermore, the DCP Study reviewed the types of zoning provi-
sions used by' other municipalities to regulate the location of adult
entertainment establishments. The Study identified two types of
regulations: the "concentration" model and the "dispersion"
model. The concentration model was developed in Boston, Massa-
chusetts, which established a two-block "adult entertainment dis-
trict" in a downtown area known as the "Combat Zone."2 9
Approximately ninety percent of adult entertainment establish-
ments in Boston are located in this district, which was established
to prevent adult uses from proliferating in other areas of the city,
and to facilitate police monitoring of such uses. Other cities utiliz-
ing the concentration model include Seattle, Washington and Cam-
den, New Jersey.3 °
Dispersion models operate in the opposite manner from concen-
tration models. Dispersion adult entertainment regulations follow
the regulations enacted by Detroit, Michigan in 1972. Detroit pro-
hibited adult entertainment establishments from locating within
1,000 feet of another adult use, or within 500 feet of a residential
area.31 Dispersal regulations seek to prevent concentrations of
adult uses and to limit them to areas remote from residential neigh-
borhoods, thus reducing their impact on residences and other sen-
sitive uses (such as schools and houses of worship). Other
municipalities with dispersal requirements include Atlanta, Geor-
gia; Los Angeles, California; Islip, New York; and Chicago, Illi-
nois. 32 New York City has chosen to follow this model as well. 33
2. DCP's Study of Adult Entertainment Impacts in New York
City
The second part of the DCP Study sought to identify the specific
impacts of adult entertainment establishments in New York City.
It did so by examining a number of impact studies conducted previ-
ously in New York, and by collecting and examining independent
data from six study and control areas throughout the city.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id. at 12.
31. Id.
32. DCP STUDY, supra note 2, at 12-14. Chicago also imposed a licensing require-
ment on adult uses, seeking to eliminate the influence of organized crime on the adult
entertainment industry. While Islip's ordinance contained a similar permitting provi-
sion for adult uses, this provision of the ordinance was ruled unconstitutional. Id. at
14. See Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 532 N.Y.S.2d 783, 793-94 (2d Dept. 1988), aff'd, 540
N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. 1989).
33. See infra Part II(B).
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The DCP Study first summarized analyses of adult entertain-
ment impacts conducted by (1) the City Planning Commission in
1977; (2) the Mayor's Office of Midtown Enforcement in 1983; (3)
the Chelsea Action Coalition and Manhattan Community Board
Four in 1993; (4) the Task Force on the Regulation of Sex-Related
Businesses in 1993; (5) the Times Square Business Improvement
District in 1993; and (6) a survey compiling media accounts of spe-
cific incidents and effects and complaint correspondence with city
agencies and officials since 1993.34 Each of these studies found
negative impacts attributable to adult entertainment establish-
ments, including increased rates of crime and prostitution, in-
creased levels of disinvestment and tax arrearage in the Times
Square area (where many adult uses clustered), decreased property
values and business levels, and quality of life complaints such as
litter, noise, and offensive signage
DCP concluded its study by analyzing conditions in six study ar-
eas containing at least one adult entertainment establishment.36
Within each area, the study compared business conditions, prop-
erty values, criminal complaints, and sanitation conditions of "sur-
vey" blockfronts (blockfronts with an adult entertainment
establishment) with those of control blockfronts (without any
adult-use establishment). DCP's independent analysis found im-
pacts relating to community character, signage, property values (as
viewed by real estate brokers), and business levels. 37 DCP's in-
dependent analysis failed, however, to find a statistically significant
relationship between adult entertainment establishments and as-
sessed valuations, criminal complaints, or sanitation problems.38
34. DCP STUDY, supra note 2, at 35-47.
35. Id. In response to its 1977 study, the City Planning Commission proposed spe-
cific zoning regulations for adult uses. The proposal was withdrawn, however, due to
the Board of Estimate's inability to reach a consensus on the proper reach of the
regulations and a recognition that new regulations might force adult uses to relocate
to different areas of the city.
36. Id. at 49-58. The study areas included two blockfront areas in Manhattan and
one each in the Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn, and Staten Island. Id. at 50 (providing
map). Despite having the greatest concentration of adult uses in the city, Times
Square was not selected as a study area, since the 1993 Times Square Business Im-
provement District's study was ongoing. Id. at 49. As noted previously, however, the
Times Square Business Improvement District Study did find significant adverse im-
pacts relating from the concentration of adult entertainment establishments in the
Times Square area. Id. at 40-42.
37. Id. at 51-54.
38. Id. at 54-58.
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B. The Adult-Use Amendments
The adult-use amendments were drafted to address, as narrowly
as possible, the impacts identified in the DCP Study. Prior to the
enactment of the amendments, adult entertainment establishments
had only to satisfy the zoning requirements for the "use group"
into which they were classified.39 For example, bookstores are
listed in use groups 6 and 12, and are allowed in a wide range of
commercial and light manufacturing zones.40 Thus, prior to enact-
ment of the adult-use amendments, an adult-only bookstore would
have been treated no differently from another bookstore, and
could have located in a commercial area abutting a residential
district.
The adult-use amendments, however, establish special defini-
tions for adult entertainment establishments, and require them to
comply with a more stringent set of zoning criteria. Under the
amendments, a commercial establishment is an adult establishment
if a substantial proportion of the establishment (based on total
floor area) is devoted to the sale of books, films, other media, or
performances characterized by an emphasis on sex, and if minors
are excluded because of age.4 ' Pursuant to the amendments, adult
establishments are permitted only in manufacturing and certain
central commercial districts.42 In addition, adult establishments
39. All permitted land uses in New York City are sorted into "use groups" based
upon common functional and/or nuisance characteristics. See NEW YORK CITY DE-
PARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, ZONING HANDBOOK 3 (1990).
40. ZONING RES. OF THE CIT OF NEW YORK, app. A, at A-4 (1961). The city is
divided into three basic zoning districts-residential (R), commercial (C), and manu-
facturing (M). Each basic district is divided further into zones based on density, park-
ing, and other requirements. l
41. Council Res. No. 1322, supra note 1, § 12-10. Specifically, adult establishments
are defined in the following manner: an "adult book store" is a book store having "a
substantial portion of its stock-in-trade in any . . . books, magazines . . . or other
printed matter ... or films, video cassettes ... or other visual representations...
characterized by an emphasis upon the depiction or description of 'specified sexual
activities' or 'specified anatomical areas.'" Id. § 12-10(a).
An "adult eating or drinking establishment" is an eating or drinking establishment
not open to minors that "regularly features live performances [or films] ... character-
ized by an emphasis on 'specified anatomical areas' or 'specified sexual activities,' ...
or [features] employees who ... regularly expose to patrons 'specified anatomical
areas.'" Id. § 12-10(b).
An "adult theater" shares substantially the same definition as an adult eating or
drinking establishment. Id. § 12-10(c). "Specified sexual activities" and "specified an-
atomical areas" are defined in the legislation as well. Id. § 12-10(d).
42. Id. § 32-01. Specifically, the adult-use amendments permit adult establish-
ments to operate in C6-4, C6-5, C6-6, C6-7, C6-8, C6-9, C7, C8, and all M-designated
zones that do not permit new residences.
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may not locate within 500 feet of any house of worship, school,
residential zoning district, any manufacturing district that allows
development of new residences, or any other adult establishment.43
The adult-use amendments also prohibit more than one adult es-
tablishment from locating on a single zoning lot, and limit adult
establishments to 10,000 square feet of floor area.44 Adult estab-
lishments that fail to satisfy these criteria are subject to termination
under the adult-use amendments, with one significant exemption 45
and an amortization provision.46
In addition to the foregoing zoning criteria, the adult-use amend-
ments set forth additional criteria for accessory business signs used
by adult uses. In commercial zones where adult establishments are
allowed to operate, accessory business signs must comply with the
signage regulations applicable in C1 (local shopping and service)
districts, and no more than one-third of the maximum allowable
sign area may be illuminated.47 In manufacturing zones, where the
size and nature of signs generally are not regulated, adult establish-
ments' signs may not exceed 150 square feet, of which only fifty
square feet may be illuminated. 48 These zoning and signage restric-
tions were designed to address specifically the impacts identified in
the DCP Study.
43. Id. Churches or schools which later locate within 500 feet of a complying
adult-use establishment cannot force it to move, however. Id.
44. Id. § 42-01. A "zoning lot" is a tract of land within one block that is desig-
nated as the lot to be developed for building permit purposes. A zoning lot may be
comprised of more than one tax (ownership) lot. Id. § 12-10.
45. Non-conforming adult establishments are required to terminate the adult na-
ture of their business within one year of their becoming non-conforming (in the case
of most existing adult establishments, this means within one year of the effective date
of the adult-use amendments). Zoning Resolution No. 1322, supra note 1, § 52-77.
The termination provision does not, however, apply to adult uses existing as of the
effective date that are non-compliant as a result of their being in excess of 10,000
square feet, location on a zoning lot with another adult establishment, or location less
than 500 feet from another adult establishment. Id. § 32-01(f).
46. Existing adult establishments may also escape the terms of the termination
provision by filing an application with the city's Board of Standards and Appeals,
which may allow continued operation for a limited time in order for the owner of the
adult establishment to amortize any substantial and un-recouped financial expendi-
tures attributable to the adult nature of the business. Id. § 72-40. However, because
most capital expenditures (such as property acquisition or improvements) are unre-
lated to the adult nature of the business, it is considered unlikely that many adult
establishments will avoid termination for substantial periods pursuant to the amorti-
zation provision.
47. Zoning Resolution No. 1322, supra note 1, § 32-69.
48. Id. § 42-55.
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III. Constitutional Protections Applicable to Adult
Entertainment Establishments and the Constitutionality
of Adult-Use Zoning Provisions
Zoning is the most widespread land use control in the United
States today.49 New York City enacted the nation's first compre-
hensive zoning resolution in 1916, and over ninety-seven percent of
cities having a population of 5,000 or more now use zoning as the
primary land use control.50 While courts were initially skeptical of
early zoning provisions on constitutional grounds as abridging indi-
vidual property rights,51 the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized states' and municipalities' authority to control land uses
through zoning in 1926.52 While the Court construed the power to
zone narrowly in the years immediately following this recogni-
tion,53 recent lower court decisions have made clear that municipal-
ities possess a broad power to "implement land use controls to
meet the increasing encroachments of urbanization on the quality
of life, ' 54 and that legislatively enacted zoning provisions enjoy a
presumption of constitutionality as a valid exercise of the state's
police power to advance the public health, safety, and welfare. 5
When a New York municipal government attempts to regulate
land uses such as bookstores or theaters, however, free speech con-
cerns arise under both the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the New York State Consti-
tution, as sexually explicit material that is not obscene 56 constitutes
49. CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE PLANNING 163 (4th
ed. 1989).
50. Id. at 163-64.
51. Id.
52. See Village of Euclid, OH v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
53. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
54. Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 551, 540 N.E.2d 215, 217, 542
N.Y.S.2d 139, 142 (1989) (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 370).
55. Dauemheim, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Hempstead, 33 N.Y.2d 468, 473, 310 N.E.2d
516, 519, 354 N.Y.S.2d 909, 914 (1974); Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, 72
N.Y.2d 121, 130, 527 N.E.2d 265, 270, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782, 787 (1988). It is pertinent to
this analysis that the New York courts have upheld specifically the rights of municipal-
ities to employ zoning to maintain aesthetics, People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 467,
191 N.E.2d 272, 274-75, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737, app. dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963), and
area character, 113 Hillside Ave. Corp. v. Zaino, 27 N.Y.2d 258, 262, 265 N.E.2d 733,
735, 317 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (1970) (citations omitted), and that the state's zoning en-
abling legislation for cities allows zoning to be used to maintain or improve property
values. N.Y. Gen. City Law §§ 20(24) and 20(25) (McKinney's 1989).
56. The Supreme Court has held that material is obscene where the average per-
son, utilizing community standards, would find that the material (taken as a whole)
appeals to a prurient interest in sex, offensively depicts sexual conduct, and lacks any
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protected speech.57 Specifically, the United States Supreme Court
has held that any regulations seeking to restrict speech on the basis
of its content are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scru-
tiny review.58 However, regulations having an impact on protected
speech will be upheld where they are content-neutral, are narrowly
tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest, and leave
open reasonable alternative avenues of communication.59
In light of these competing doctrines allowing government to
regulate land use on the one hand and protecting sexually explicit
material on the other, the United States Supreme Court and the
New York Court of Appeals have developed discrete sets of stan-
dards by which to analyze adult-use zoning provisions. Ms. Simon
argues in her Note that both federal and state caselaw require that
there be no reduction in the total number of adult entertainment
establishments as a result of a restrictive zoning ordinance. 60 I will
address these issues in turn.
A. Federal Standards
1. Supreme Court Caselaw
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of a
municipality's power to regulate adult uses through zoning in
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. .61 At issue in Young was
the City of Detroit's amendment of its "Anti-Skid Row Ordi-
nance" (the "Detroit amendments") to prohibit adult theaters
from locating within 1,000 feet of a series of "regulated uses ' 62 or
within 500 feet of a residential area.63 For purposes of the Detroit
amendments, Detroit defined an adult theater as one which is used
to present "material characterized by an emphasis on. . . 'Specified
literary, artistic, scientific, or political value. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973).
57. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
58. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980); Police Dept. of Chicago
v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
59. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
60. Simon, supra note 8, at 209.
61. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
62. Id. at 52 n.3 (quoting Detroit ordinance list of uses including, inter alia, adult
motion picture theaters, mini-theaters of under 50 seats, establishments selling alco-
hol for consumption on the premises, hotels, pawn shops, secondhand stores and
shoeshine parlors).
63. Id at 52 n.2.
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Sexual Activities' 64 or 'Specified Anatomical Areas.' ' 65 Like New
York and other cities, the Detroit Common Council enacted these
changes in light of findings that concentrations of certain land uses
(such as adult theaters) have a deleterious impact on the surround-
ing community.66
The plaintiffs in Young attacked the Detroit amendments on a
variety of grounds. Specifically, they maintained that the amend-
ments (1) were predicated on definitions that were so vague as to
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2)
violated the First Amendment as a prior restraint on protected
speech; and (3) created a classification of theaters based on the
content of films shown, violating the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.67 After dismissing the vagueness ar-
gument on both substantive and standing grounds,68 the Court
turned to the First Amendment and equal protection aspects of the
case.
With regard to the plaintiffs' prior restraint argument, Justice
Stevens opened his plurality opinion by noting that under Detroit's
zoning ordinance, all motion picture theaters-not just those de-
voted to adult fare-were required to satisfy certain locational and
other requirements, and that there was no dispute as to the city's
power to impose these requirements.69 Stated simply, the plurality
held that there was no constitutional impediment to the application
of zoning laws to the "commercial exploitation of material pro-
tected by the First Amendment, ' 70 and held that classifying thea-
ters based on the content of their films was not prohibited as a
prior restraint on speech where the classification was reasonable
and necessary to further significant governmental interests. 71
64. Id. at 53 n.4 (defining "Specified Sexual Activities" to include human genitals
in a state of arousal, acts of human masturbation, intercourse or sodomy, and erotic
touching of genitals, buttocks, pubic region and female breast).
65. Id. (quoting Detroit ordinance defining "Specified Anatomical Areas" to in-
clude human genitals, pubic region, buttocks and female breast below the top of the
areola if such areas are not "completely and opaquely" covered, as well as the human
male penis in erect state, regardless of whether it is covered). This definition, as well
as that of "Specified Sexual Activities," is almost indistinguishable from the defini-
tions included in New York's adult-use amendments. See Council Res. No. 1322,
supra note 1, § 12-10.
66. Young, 427 U.S. at 54 & n.6.
67. Id. at 58.
68. Id. at 58-60.
69. Id at 62.
70. Id.
71. Young, 427 U.S. at 63 n.18 (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1948)).
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Justice Stevens then turned to the plaintiffs' argument that the
distinction between adult and non-adult theaters violated the
Equal Protection Clause. He started his analysis by noting that
"above all else, the First Amendment means -that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content. ' 72 Having set forth this broad princi-
ple, however, Justice Stevens noted that the Court had, in many
instances, ruled that the level of protection afforded by the First
Amendment varies based on the content of the speech and/or the
setting in which it is delivered, 73 and took, specific notice of deci-
sions holding that based on their content alone, commercial speech
and obscene sexual materials enjoyed a lesser level of protection
under the First Amendment.74
Based on these decisions and his observation that "the regula-
tion of the places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited is
unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical message a,
film may be intending to communicate, ' 75 Justice Stevens con-
cluded that while a total suppression of non-obscene erotic mate-
rial would be impermissible, such material warrants less protection
than "untrammeled political debate" and ruled that Detroit was
authorized to differentiate, on the basis of content, sexually explicit
and non-sexually explicit films. 76
Justice Stevens concluded his opinion with a determination of
whether Detroit's interest in preserving the character of its neigh-
borhoods justified the zoning classifications made by the Detroit
amendments. Finding that the administrative record revealed an
empirical basis for the amendments, he ruled that it was not the,
Court's function to "appraise the wisdom of [Detroit's] decision to
require adult theaters to be separated rather than concentrated in
the same areas. ' 77 He further noted that municipalities' interest in
72. Id. at 64 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 66-68 & nn.23-24. Specifically, Justice Stevens took note of the Court's
rulings declining to give protection to "fighting words," see Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942); speech that compromises national security, see Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); and limiting the states' power to
enforce libel laws in cases involving public figures, see New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
74. Young, 427 U.S. at 67-69 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech) and Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding conviction for distribution of non-obscene sex-
ual material to minors)).
75. Id. at 70.
76. Id. at 70-71.
77. Id. at 71.
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preserving the quality of life "must be accorded high respect," and
held that this interest adequately supported Detroit's
classification.78
As noted previously, Justice Stevens's opinion in Young failed to
persuade a majority of the Court, and the portion of his opinion
devoted to the Equal Protection Clause was joined by only three
other members of the Court.79 Any lack of clarity or authority on
the question was resolved ten years later, however, by the Court's
decision in City' of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,80 a case in-
volving an attempt by the City of Renton, Washington to regulate
adult theaters through zoning.
Renton concerned a substantially identical situation to that in
Young. In April 1981, at the behest of its Mayor and following a
review of the experiences of Seattle and other cities, 81 the City of
Renton enacted a zoning ordinance prohibiting any adult motion
picture theater from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential
zone, dwelling, church, park, or school.82 At the outset of his opin-
ion for the Court, then-Justice Rehnquist established the critical
threshold test for whether an adult-use zoning ordinance will sur-
Vive review-where the ordinance was designed to prevent secon-
dary impacts attributable to adult uses (such as crime, a decline in
property values, or a deterioration in the quality of urban life), it
would be analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction. Where, however, the ordinance could not be justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, it would
be presumptively invalid as content-based.8 3 In agreement with the
district court, Justice Rehnquist found that the Renton ordinance,
which by its terms was devoted to combatting the secondary im-
78. Id. at 71-72.
79. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice White joined Justice Ste-
vens's opinion. Id. at 53. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, but specifically
disassociated himself from the Equal Protection discussion. See Young, 427 U.S. at 73
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
80. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
81. Id at 44. At the time the Renton ordinance was considered and enacted, the
City had no adult theaters within its boundaries. Id.
82. Id. Like the Detroit amendments and the New York City adult-use amend-
ments, Renton defined an adult theater as any building used for presenting visual
displays (by any media) "distinguished or characteri[zed] by an emphasis on... 'spec-
ified sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas."' Id.
83. Id. at 46-48 (citations omitted). Justice Rehnquist expressly repudiated the
Court of Appeals's analysis, which focused on the legislature's intent in enacting the
ordinance, noting that courts may not inquire into a legislative body's motivation in
enacting a statute. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
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pacts associated with adult theaters, fit the definition of a content-
neutral ordinance. s4
Having made this threshold determination, the Court held that
the "appropriate inquiry" was whether the Renton ordinance was
designed to serve a substantial governmental interest while leaving
available reasonable alternative avenues for the regulated commu-
nication. 5 Relying on Justice Stevens's opinion in Young, the
Court expressed little doubt that it met this standard. Specifically,
Justice Rehnquist restated the Young Court's finding that a city's
interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life was to
be accorded high respect, and termed that interest "vital. '8 6 In ad-
dition, the Court rejected the Court of Appeals's ruling that Ren-
ton's failure to conduct an independent study rendered its findings
concerning the relationship between adult uses and neighborhood
blight "conclusory and speculative,"87 and ruled instead that the
Renton City Council was entitled to rely upon the studies con-
ducted by other cities as a basis for enacting the ordinance, so long
as it reasonably believed the other cities' studies to be relevant to
the problems Renton sought to address.8 8 Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded his opinion for the Court in the following manner:
In sum, we find that the Renton ordinance represents a valid
governmental response to the 'admittedly serious problems'
caused by adult theaters [citation omitted]. Renton has not used
'the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression, [cita-
tion omitted], but rather has sought to make some areas avail-
able for adult theaters and their patrons, while at the same time
preserving the quality of life in the community at large by
preventing those theaters from locating in other areas. This, af-
ter all, is the essence of zoning. Here, as in American Mini The-
aters, the city has enacted a zoning ordinance that meets these
goals while also satisfying the dictates of the First
Amendment.8 9
Based upon the Court's decisions in Young and Renton, the fed-
eral constitutional test for adult-use zoning amendments is clear.
First, the reviewing court must be satisfied that the subject ordi-
nance is content-neutral, i.e., designed expressly not to suppress
84. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
85. Id. at 50.
86. Id. (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71).
87. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 748 F.2d 527, 537 (9th Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
88. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-51.
89. Id. at 54-55.
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sexually-oriented speech, but rather to combat the secondary ef-
fects of sex businesses. If this first requirement is met, the city will
then be required to show-based on empirical evidence that is rea-
sonably relevant to the city at issue-that the ordinance is designed
to serve a substantial governmental interest (such as preservation
of the quality of urban life in the community) while providing rea-
sonable alternative avenues for communication.
Ms. Simon's analysis concerning the reduction in the number of
adult-use establishments begins by noting that in Young, Justices
Stevens (writing for the plurality) and Powell (who concurred, pro-
viding the fifth vote) concluded that the Detroit adult-use ordi-
nance was constitutional because "it did not reduce the public's
access to adult entertainment, nor did it 'affect the operation of
existing establishments but only the location of new ones."'90
However, neither Justice Stevens's plurality nor Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Young may be read so broadly as to conclude
that they would have invalidated the Detroit ordinance solely on
the basis that it reduced the number of adult establishments. To be
sure, after noting that "what is ultimately at stake is nothing more
than a limitation on the place where adult films may be exhibited,"
Justice Stevens noted that "[t]he situation would be quite different
if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting
access to, lawful speech."'" Similarly, Justice Powell based his con-
clusion on the fact that the Detroit ordinance did not cause a "sig-
nificant overall curtailment" of adult movie presentations.92
Neither of these statements, however, may reasonably be read to
require municipalities regulating adult entertainment establish-
ments somehow to guarantee that the number of such establish-
ments will remain constant or even increase in the post-regulation
period.
Neither Young nor Renton included any statement indicating
that a reduction in the number of adult entertainment establish-
ments occasioned by an adult-use zoning ordinance would affect
that ordinance's ability to withstand constitutional review. This
fact undermines Ms. Simon's argument that the Supreme Court's
decision in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim93 -which struck
down the Borough of Mt. Ephraim, New Jersey's ordinance
prohibiting nude dancing or live entertainment-requires a finding
90. Simon, supra note 8, at 209 (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35).
91. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 & n.35 (emphasis added).
92. Itc at 79.
93. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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of unconstitutionality for New York's regulations. While the bor-
ough had argued that its action was consistent with the Court's rul-
ing in Young, the Court found the situation distinguishable, noting
that the Detroit ordinance "did not affect the number of movie
theaters that could operate in the city; it merely dispersed them."94
Notwithstanding this language, the fact remains that Schad, which
was decided prior to Renton and involved a totally distinguishable
factual scenario-namely, a total ban on a constitutionally pro-
tected activity-cannot be viewed as binding caselaw where loca-
tional criteria are involved.
2. Applications of Renton
While the Second Circuit has not been called upon to construe
the Supreme Court's holding in Renton, lower federal courts in var-
ious other circuits have offered relatively consistent analyses reflec-,
tive of the Supreme Court's apparent desire to afford states and,
localities significant latitude in combatting the adverse secondary
effects of adult establishments through zoning requirements.
Ms. Simon finds additional support for her argument that a re-
duction in the number of adult establishments is unconstitutional in
decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth95 and Ninth96 Cir-
cuits invalidating, municipal adult-use ordinances for failing to pro-
vide reasonable alternative opportunities for expression under
Renton. Both of these cases, however, involved clear violations of
Renton's requirement that reasonable alternative avenues of ex-
pression exist for the adult-oriented speech or conduct being regu-
lated,97 in that the ordinances went beyond reducing the number of
adult-use establishments to make them virtually impossible to es-
tablish or continue. The first of these cases, Walnut Properties v.
City of Whittier,98 struck down Whittier, California's ordinance
mandating a 1000 foot minimum distance between adult uses, and
between adult uses and sensitive uses. Finding that the ordinance
left just under 100 acres available for adult entertainment establish-
ments-only 1.4% of the available land in the city-the Court of
Appeals found that the ordinance would force the closing of all
then-existing adult theaters in Whittier and deny any reasonable
94. Id. at 71.
95. Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1059 (1988).
96. Walnut Properties v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989).
97. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
98. 861 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989).
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opportunity to open any new ones.99 Taken together, the minimal
amount of land left available and the ordinance's effect of forcing
all existing theaters out of business led the court to strike the ordi-
nance down as unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit faced an even more
glaring violation of the Renton standard in Christy v. City of Ann
Arbor.100 In that case, the City of Ann Arbor, Michigan left just
over one-half square mile-or .023% of the city's land area-avail'-
able to adult entertainment establishments. The overly restrictive
nature of the Ann Arbor zoning measure led the Sixth Circuit to
find that it created a situation equivalent to the one at issue in
Schad, in that it effectively banned adult entertainment establish-
ments in the city.' 0'
Neither of these cases involved ordinances similar to New York
City. The decisions in Walnut Properties and Christy involved clear
and unmistakable violations of the Renton standard in that they
imposed a virtual ban on adult uses within cities, and cannot be
read so broadly as to support Ms. Simon's proposition that any re-
duction in the number of adult uses in a city as a result of an adult-
use ordinance renders that ordinance unconstitutional.
More persuasive and relevant to any analysis of the New York
City adult-use amendments are the federal cases, such as O'Malley
v. City of Syracuse'0 2 and Ambassador Books & Video, Inc. v. City
of Little Rock,10 3 which upheld adult-use zoning provisions that re-
semble the New York provisions. 04 In Ambassador Books, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a Little Rock, Ar-
kansas ordinance on a straightforward application of Renton. Spe-
cifically, the court found that Little Rock's ordinance (which
closely resembled, but was slightly more restrictive than the New
York. City adult-use amendments) was content neutral, as it ad-
99. Id. at 1108-09.
100. 824 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988).
101. Id. The court also found that Ann Arbor'neither indicated an intent to com-
bat the negative secondary impacts of adult uses nor included any evidence demon-
strating that the ordinance would prevent them, leading it to rule that Ann Arbor had
violated Renton's basic requirement of showing that its adult-use ordinance was
designed to achieve a legitimate governmental objective. Id. at 493. For another ex-
ample of an ordinance that clearly failed to meet the Renton criteria, see Janra Enter-
prises, Inc. v. City of Reno, 818 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Nev. 1993) (ordinance not based on
any empirical evidence; city official testified that ordinance designed in part to keep
adult uses away from children, although included establishments with liquor license as
sensitive receptor).
102. 813 F. Supp. 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
103. 20 F.3d 858 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 186 (1994).
104. See supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
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dressed the secondary impacts of adult entertainment establish-
ments but not the content of the speech promoted therein. In
addition, the court ruled that the 520 acres remaining available in
the city for adult uses-equal to 6.75% of the land in areas where
adult uses would continue to be permitted under the ordinance-
provided reasonable alternative avenues of communication. °5 The
Court of Appeals therefore upheld the Little Rock ordinance. 10 6
The federal district court for the Northern District of New York
reached a similar conclusion under Renton in O'Malley v. City of
Syracuse.'0 7 Syracuse's adult-use ordinance included a separation
provision requiring adult uses to locate a minimum of 1000 feet
from any sensitive use. The ordinance was predicated on the city's
findings, based exclusively on its collection of data from other mu-
nicipalities, that the ordinance would prevent crime, maintain
property values, protect retail trade, and preserve community
character. 10 8
The Syracuse ordinance left approximately 4% of the city avail-
able to adult entertainment establishments. The district court
noted that this estimate resulted from a conservative analysis that
excluded sites unlikely to become available. It upheld the ordi-
nance, finding that the 4% figure was sufficient under the circum-
stances to satisfy the Renton standard. Again, sufficient remaining
land area available for adult uses, not the overall number of such
establishments that could remain in the post-regulation period, was
the determining factor.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the Renton
test to Los Angeles' adult-use ordinance in Topanga Press, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles.10 9 The most significant part of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Topanga Press dealt with Renton's requirement
that municipalities regulating adult uses leave reasonable avenues
of communication available for adult entertainment establishments
forced into noncompliance by restrictive zoning ordinances. While
it found that the Los Angeles ordinance was content neutral, the
105. Ambassador Books, 20 F.3d at 862. The Supreme Court in Renton had found
it sufficient that "more than five percent" of land remained available under the Ren-
ton ordinance. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53.
106. The Eighth Circuit had upheld similar adult-use restrictions on two previous
occasions as well, following the Renton analysis. See Ambassador Books, 20 F.3d at
862 (citing Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 928 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1991) and Holm-
berg v. City of Ramsey, 12 F.3d 140 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 59 (1994).
107. 813 F. Supp. 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
108. Id. at 145.
109. 989 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1537 (1994).
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Court enjoined enforcement of the ordinance on the ground that
reasonable alternative avenues for sexually-explicit speech were
not available.
In Renton, the Supreme Court had ruled that courts were fore-
closed from questioning whether relocation sites left available in a
particular adult-use ordinance were "economically viable" sites for
relocation, holding instead that adult businesses must "fend for
themselves" in the relevant real estate market. 110 In Topanga
Press, the Ninth Circuit sought to clarify further the concept of
"potentially available" relocation sites without violating the
Supreme Court's injunction against analyzing the economic viabil-
ity of individual sites. Specifically, the Court, utilizing the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Woodall v. City of El Paso"' as a starting
point, identified several criteria that reviewing courts could use to
determine whether land represented by the regulating municipality
as available to adult uses actually constituted a potential relocation
site. These criteria were: (1) whether the land would ever become
available to any commercial enterprise; (2) whether the land was
reasonably accessible to the general public; (3) whether the land
was improved with proper infrastructure for development (such as
sidewalks, street lamps, roads, etc.); (4) whether the land is "gener-
ically suitable" to commercial development; and (5) whether the
property is zoned to permit commercial development. 112 Accord-
ing to the court, only land meeting all five of these criteria could be
considered as available for relocation by newly regulated adult
uses.11
3
A considerable portion of the land that Los Angeles represented
would continue to be available for adult uses under its ordinance
(which, like all the other ordinances described herein, set forth
minimum distance requirements between adult businesses and enu-
merated "sensitive receptors") failed to satisfy one or more of the
court's criteria. Substantial portions of the land were submerged
beneath the Pacific Ocean or were being used as either runways in
the Los Angeles International and Van Nuys Airports, landfills, or
petroleum storage facilities.114 After subtracting these properties
(which accounted for 36% of the land initially identified by Los
110. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
111. 959 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.), modifying 950 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 908 (1992).
112. Topanga Press, 989 F.2d at 1531.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1532.
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Angeles as available) and then calculating the amount of land that
was zoned for commercial use, the court found that only 0.18% of
the "realistically available" land in Los Angeles was available for
adult uses.115 The court therefore affirmed the district court's or-
der enjoining the ordinance's enforcement.
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that Renton will continue to
be construed in a straightforward manner, and that adult-use ordi-
nances that seek to address the adverse secondary impacts of adult
uses will be upheld where (1) those impacts have been identified
and (2) a reasonable amount of realistically-available land-proba-
bly no less than 5%-remains available to adult uses.116
Ms. Simon's second argument that the New York City adult-use
zoning resolution violates the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution contends that the adult-use amendments are
unconstitutionally overbroad because they cover topless dancing
establishments, which she claims the city has not shown to cause
adverse secondary impacts." 7 This argument flows from an overly
restrictive reading of the empirical evidence utilized by the Depart-
ment of City Planning in developing the adult-use amendments.
The DCP Study noted that "upscale topless clubs have become a
booming segment of the adult entertainment industry."' 8 The
DCP Study also found that these newer topless clubs are successful
because they have shed their "sleazy image" and have moved to
the mainstream by "providing topless entertainment in safe, 'ele-
gant' surroundings" furnished with amenities such as large-screen
televisions and air hockey." 9 However, while the DCP Study
noted that thirty of these "upscale" clubs existed in the City in
1992, there were a total of sixty-eight topless or nude bars, meaning
that more than half of the City's topless bars fail to meet DCP's
definition of "upscale." These remaining bars likely do not share
115. Id.
116. For other decisions upholding similar adult-use zoning provisions, see also
Grand Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, 27 F.3d 1068 (5th Cir. 1994) (1000 foot sepa-
ration from sensitive receptors upheld); ILQ Investments, Inc. v. City of Rochester,
25 F.3d 1413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 578 (1994) (750 foot separation provi-
sion from sensitive receptors upheld based entirely on data from neighboring munici-
pality); Holmberg v. City of Ramsey, 12 F.3d 140 (8th Cir. 1993) (1000 foot separation
provision from sensitive receptors upheld), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 59 (1994); T-Marc,
Inc. v. Pinellas County, 804 F. Supp. 1500 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (400 foot separation provi-
sion from sensitive receptors and other adult uses upheld).
117. Simon, supra note 8, at 214.
118. DCP STUDY, supra note 2, at 18.
119. Id. at 18-19.
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their "upscale" siblings' devotion to "elegant surroundings" and air
hockey.
Zoning is a blunt regulatory tool, ill-equipped to address specific
aesthetic and operational aspects of the uses it regulates. And
while it is safe to assume that certain topless bars operate in a
tasteful and "elegant" manner, there is no way for a zoning scheme
to distinguish between such bars and those that choose not to oper-
ate in such a "dignified" fashion. In short, the DCP Study-based
on independent data collection and analysis and reliance on other
studies conducted in New York City and nationwide-concluded
that adult entertainment establishments result in a variety of nega-
tive secondary impacts on their host communities.
.Certain topless bars have contributed significantly to this prob-
lem, just as some others are doubtless free from blame. As one
federal appellate court has already ruled, such individualized evi-
dence is irrelevant when analyzing the constitutionality of a zoning
ordinance of general application that is supported by evidence that
adult uses generate unwanted secondary impacts.120 Because the
adult-use industry's record, taken as a whole, provides ample justi-
fication for the adult-use amendments, and because it would be im-
possible for a zoning scheme to differentiate between "elegant"
and "non-elegant" topless bars, it is legally irrelevant that a small
subclass of the industry operates in a manner that (arguably) does
not contribute to the City's problems with the adult entertainment
industry as a whole. 12 1
120. See International Eateries of America, Inc. v. Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157
(11th Cir. 1991) (fact that adult entertainment establishment has proven that it does
not generate negative secondary impacts is irrelevant in determining constitutionality
of adult-use ordinance or application of that ordinance to impact-free establishment),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 920 (1992).
121. Ms. Simon's argument appears to stand on the premise that only the independ-
ent data and analysis contained in the DCP Study-as opposed to that data taken in
connection with the studies conducted in other municipalities and states, as well as
previous studies within New York-constitute the empirical basis against which the
adult-use amendments will be reviewed for their sufficiency. Such a premise, how-
ever, provides a shaky foundation in light of the standards set forth by the Supreme
Court in Renton and the Court of Appeals in Islip. The Court in Renton was quite
clear on the subject, ruling that the City of Renton (which haid not conducted an
independent study of any kind, but relied exclusively on a study conducted by Seattle)
"was entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle and other cities," and noting that
"the First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting [an adult-use ordi-
nance], to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already gen-
erated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses." Renton, 475 U.S. at
51-52. The Court of Appeals's decision in Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544,
555, 540 N.E.2d 215, 220, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139, 144 (1989), supports the same proposi-
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B. State Standards
While the First and Fourteenth Amendments 122 to the United
States Constitution set forth the basic restrictions on governmental
regulation of expression, states remain free to impose additional
restrictions through their own constitutions. 123  The New York
State Court of Appeals has held that in light of "recognized princi-
ples of federalism" and the state's "history and tradition of foster-
ing freedom of expression," the state constitution may in certain
circumstances afford additional protections to speech beyond the
federal minimum.1 24
The New York Court of Appeals developed its analytical frame-
work for adult zoning ordinances in Town of Islip v. Caviglia.125 At
issue in Islip was the Town of Islip's zoning ordinance prohibiting
adult uses from locating within 500 feet of a number of sensitive
receptors (such as residential zones, houses of worship, parks, and
schools) or within one half-mile of another adult use. After finding
that the Islip ordinance satisfied the federal constitutional stan-
dards established by the Supreme Court in Renton, 26 the Court of
Appeals turned to the plaintiff's argument that the New York State
Constitution provided a heightened level of protection.
The Court of Appeals began its discussion of state constitutional
issues in a fashion similar to the federal analysis, by noting that the
tion, notwithstanding Ms. Simon's argument that the Court of Appeals, by noting that
Islip's case was "far stronger" than Renton's, imposed more demanding evidentiary
requirements on New York municipalities than did the Supreme Court. In fact, the
Court of Appeals criticized the Renton ordinance as underinclusive because it ex-
cluded certain adult-uses. 73 N.Y.2d at 555, 540 N.E.2d at 220, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
The court nowhere stated that a city's independent study of the impacts of adult uses
would serve as the sole or primary evidentiary basis for determining whether the req-
uisite governmental interest existed and would be served by the proposed regulation.
Inferences aside, there is no basis from which to conclude that the Court of Appeals
intended in Islip to create more rigorous evidentiary requirements for municipalities
than the Supreme Court established in Renton.
122. In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment serves as a vehicle through which
many provisions of the first eight Amendments apply to the states. For an explana-
tion of the incorporation doctrine's development, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 772-74 (2d ed. 1988).
123. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); People v. P.J.
Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 303, 501 N.E.2d 556, 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 912 (1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
124. See Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 556, 540 N.E.2d 215, 221, 542
N.Y.S.2d 139, 144 (1989) (citing People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553,
558, 503 N.E.2d 492, 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (1986) [hereinafter Arcara II]).
125. Id. at 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1989).
126. Id. at 555, 540 N.E.2d at 220-21, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 144-45.
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Islip ordinance was justified by concerns unrelated to speech. 127
The court noted, however, that this finding was not dispositive,
identifying the relevant analysis under state constitutional law as
whether "the Town went too far and enacted an ordinance that had
an impermissible incidental effect abridging free expression, '"128
and applied the standard set forth in People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud
Books.
129
The issue in Arcara was whether the Erie County District Attor-
ney could order the closing of a bookstore based on patrons' en-
gaging in illegal sexual acts on the premises. The bookstore itself
was never accused of any wrongdoing, and no effort was ever made
to prevent the customers from engaging in unlawful activity. The
bookstore owner therefore challenged the District Attorney's ac-
tion on the ground that the First Amendment mandated less drastic
action (such as arresting those responsible for the illegality or seek-
ing an injunction against such activities) before the bookstore
could be closed. The Court of Appeals agreed, and vacated the
District Attorney's actions on federal constitutional grounds. 130
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Dis-
trict Attorney's actions were indeed consistent with First Amend-
ment standards. 3' On remand, however, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the District Attorney's conduct ran afoul of the state
constitution, and held that even where regulations that have an in-
cidental impact on speech are justified by legitimate and important
governmental interests, those regulations must be no broader than
necessary to achieve the purpose behind the regulation. 132
Applying this test to the Islip ordinance, the Court of Appeals
had little difficulty in distinguishing the cases and finding that the
ordinance satisfied the more rigorous state law test. Specifically,
the court ruled that while the problem at issue in Arcara-unlawful
sexual activity in a bookstore-could have been addressed through
direct intervention, the adverse effects caused by the adult estab-
lishments in Islip-such as a decline in property values and neigh-
borhood deterioration-could not be addressed in such a direct
manner. The court therefore concluded that "the Town's use of its
127. Id. at 558, 540 N.E.2d at 222, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
128. Id. (citation omitted).
129. Arcara II, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986).
130. People ex rel Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d 1089,
491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985), rev'd sub nom. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697
(1986) [hereinafter Arcara I].
131. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986).
132. Arcara II, 503 N.E.2d at 495.
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zoning powers was the most appropriate means" to address the
problems caused by the establishments, and was not subject to judi-
cial second-guessing. 133 This conclusion was based on the court's
finding that "ample space" remained for adult uses after the ordi-
nance took effect, and that adult uses were not "unduly re-
strict[ed]... to limited or unsuitable areas of the Town." '134 The
court therefore sustained the Islip ordinance on state constitutional
grounds as well.
Ms. Simon argues that Islip supports her contention that the
adult-use amendments violate the state constitution because they
seek to regulate topless bars, which she believes the DCP Study
failed to prove had deleterious secondary impacts as a class. She
claims that "the court stressed that had the facts shown that by
enforcing the ordinance 'the total number of adult bookstores will
decline or that fewer potential customers will be able to conve-
niently patronize them,' the ordinance would not have met the
strict requirements of the New York State Constitution.' 1 35 Specif-
ically, however, the Court said the following:
Manifestly, the zoning regulations are less restrictive than ban-
ning adult uses altogether, and more compatible with free
speech values than a licensing scheme which arguably could
present opportunities for the improper abuse of discretion. Sig-
nificantly, the stipulated facts demonstrate that there remains
ample space available for adult uses after the rezoning and it is
neither claimed nor established that if the ordinance is enforced
the total number of adult bookstores will decline or that fewer
potential customers will be able to conveniently patronize
them.13
6
While this language makes it clear that the Court of Appeals,
like the United States Supreme Court in Young, was concerned
that no significant reduction in the availability of adult material oc-
cur as a result of the ordinance, the fact remains that neither the
Court of Appeals nor any federal court has ruled that the govern-
ment must show that the number of adult entertainment establish-
ments will remain unchanged following enactment of an ordinance
that restricts the location of adult entertainment uses through
zoning.
133. Islip, 73 N.Y.2d at 559-60, 540 N.E.2d at 223, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
134. Id.
135. Simon, supra note 8, at 212.
136. Islip, 73 N.Y.2d at 559-60, 540 N.E.2d at 223, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
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The essence of zoning makes clear why this is. Zoning serves a
broad purpose, and in most instances it does nothing more than
create basic rules to govern locational decisions that are made ulti-
mately by the prospective user of land based on economic and myr-
iad other subjective considerations. Because the private real estate
market and the market for services ultimately determine what land
uses will take root and where, it is usually impossible to determine
what the precise impact-in terms of numbers of uses-of a zoning
change will be. 137 In light of the imprecise and blunt nature of zon-
ing as a regulatory tool, any constitutional mandate that it guaran-
tee the existing number of uses in a land use category-even one
with First Amendmentprotection-would impose a standard of ex-
actitude unlikely ever to be realized. 138
Even if federal and/or state constitutional standards did require
the city to maintain the number of adult entertainment establish-
ments, it is clear that a sufficient number of sites will exist to ac-
commodate that number. The DCP Study found that 177 adult
entertainment establishments existed in New York City in 1993.139
However, as noted earlier, the Department of City Planning found
that over 400 sites in central commercial and manufacturing dis-
tricts would continue to be available for adult uses under the adult-
use amendments. 140 Clearly, enough sites will remain available for
existing adult entertainment establishments to continue their oper-
ations, albeit in new locations and with a potential increase in com-
petition for available sites. 141 In short, Ms. Simon's assertion that
137. New York City's recent experiences with manufacturing provide a useful illus-
tration of this fact. Having experienced a dramatic decline in the number of manufac-
turing jobs beginning in the 1960's, the city implemented zoning changes intended to
reduce competition for land in manufacturing districts by restricting the types of uses
that could locate there. While the zoning changes were unsuccessful in reviving the
city's industrial economy, they also resulted in blocking almost all new development
in manufacturing districts, leaving those districts with considerable amounts of vacant,
abandoned, and underutilized land. See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CiTy
PLANNING, Comprehensive Retail Strategy for New York City, Winter 1995, at 9.
138. Indeed, were a standard as strict as Ms. Simon suggests to exist, the entire New
York City Zoning Resolution would be subject to constitutional attack. For it seems
unquestionable that uses such as bookstores, theaters, and assembly halls-all land
uses with significant First Amendment value-would exist in higher numbers were it
not for the fact that they are restricted to operating in specified zoning districts.
139. DCP STUDY, supra note 2, at ii.
140. See supra note 114.
141. The number of available relocation sites and administrative accounting for un-
suitable sites distinguishes this situation from the one in Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993), where the Ninth Circuit found that the
City's identification of 120 potential relocation sites for 102 existing adult-use busi-
nesses was insufficient. Most obviously, the existence of 400 sites for under 200 busi-
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the adult-use amendments are unconstitutional because they will
reduce the number of existing adult businesses is unfounded both
factually and legally, rendering unnecessary her proposed remedy
to that impediment: that the adult-use amendments should be
amended further to allow adult uses to locate as-of-right in all com-
mercial zones. 142
IV. Analysis of the Adult-Use Amendments Under Applicable
Constitutional Principles
The cases discussed in the foregoing section set forth the stan-
dards that any governmental attempt to regulate adult establish-
ments in New York must satisfy to avoid constitutional
nullification. This section explains how the adult-use amendments
indeed satisfy the tests set forth by the federal and state courts.
It seems clear that, on their face, the adult-use amendments sat-
isfy federal constitutional standards as enunciated in Renton and
applied by both federal and state courts. All of the official docu-
mentation and memoranda supporting the adult-use amendments
make clear that the amendments were formulated and proposed
for the purpose of combatting the secondary adverse impacts of
adult entertainment establishments, rather than suppressing sexu-
ally explicit speech per se.143 Under the rule set forth in Renton,
the adult-use amendments qualify as a content-neutral ordi-
nance. 144 Having established that the ordinance is designed to
combat the secondary impacts of adult uses and thus content-neu-
tral, the next inquiry is whether the ordinance is designed to serve
a substantial governmental interest while providing reasonable al-
ternative avenues for communication.
nesses provides ample relocation opportunity. In addition, New York City clearly has
identified these alternative sites more accurately, ensuring that they are actually avail-
able (as opposed to being located on airfields or under the ocean).
142. It is worth noting that Ms. Simon herself concedes that adult uses have a sig-
nificant negative impact in commercial areas, citing evidence that adult uses typically
lower the rental value of upper-floor commercial space in buildings containing a
ground-floor adult use. See Simon, supra note 2, at 2-5 & n.191.
143. See Memorandum from Paul A. Crotty, Corporation Counsel, to Members of
the City Council Land Use Committee, at 2 (describing intent of adult-use amend-
ments) (copy on file with the author) [hereinafter "Crotty Memorandum"]; CPC RE-
PORT, supra note 3, pp. 1-5, 33-43; testimony of Joseph B. Rose, Chair, City Planning
Commission, before the City Council Land Use Committee, October 19, 1995 (on file
with the author). See also Statements of Walter L. McCaffrey, Chair, before the City
Council Subcommittee on Zoning & Franchises, October 19, 1995, and June Eisland,
Chair, before the City Council Committee on Land Use, October 19, 1995 (on file
with the author).
144. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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The City Planning Commission's Report (the "CPC Report")
approving the adult-use amendments was based upon a variety of
data demonstrating that adult entertainment establishments have
significant adverse impacts on their host communities. Specifically,
the Planning Commission considered analyses conducted by other
states and municipalities, examined data and conclusions from pre-
vious studies measuring the impact of adult uses in New York City,
and commissioned the Department of City Planning to conduct its
own study prior to its consideration and adoption of the adult-use
amendments. 145 All of these studies confirm, albeit to varying de-
grees, that adult entertainment establishments have negative im-
pacts on their communities in the form of decreased property
values, higher crime, and diminished commercial viability.' 46 This
administrative record clearly supports the City Planning Commis-
sion's decision to subject adult entertainment establishments to in-
creased zoning regulation in an effort to combat these secondary
impacts and preserve the quality of urban life. 47
The final determination to be made under Renton is whether the
ordinance at issue provides sufficient alternative avenues of com-
munication. It is in this area where there has been some disagree-
ment within the courts, and where the most spirited challenge to
the ordinance is likely to arise with regard to federal constitutional
law.
The Department of City Planning concluded that the adult-use
amendments would leave 11.1% of the land in New York City, or
more than 400 individual sites, available for use by adult entertain-
ment establishments. 148 These percentages significantly exceed the
percentages approved by the Supreme Court in Renton ("over five
percent") and the Eighth Circuit in Ambassador Book & Video
(6.75%).149
In addition, the Department of City Planning took the Ninth Cir-
cuit's analysis in Topanga Press into account when calculating the
amount of land available for adult uses under the adult-use amend-
ments. Specifically, the Department excluded property that was
unlikely ever to become available for use by adult entertainment
establishments, such as publicly owned land, wetlands, airport and
145. See supra notes 21-47 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
148. Statement of Walter L. McCaffrey, supra note 143, at 9; Crotty Memorandum,
supra note 143, at 6.
149. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53; Ambassador Book & Video, 20 F.3d at 864.
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other transportation-related property, tank farms, or property
owned or used by public utilities.1 0 The Department also calcu-
lated the accessibility of the remaining sites via public transporta-
tion, and found that 80% of the sites would be located less than a
ten-minute walk from a subway or major bus line. 151 In short, it is
clear that the adult-use amendments meet the Renton require-
ments and are no more restrictive than other similar ordinances
approved by lower federal courts in recent years.
The adult-use amendments satisfy New York State constitutional
standards as well. As noted above, the pertinent inquiry under Ar-
ticle I, Section 7 of the state constitution is whether the adult-use
amendments "go too far" by giving rise to incidental effects abridg-
ing free expression. 152 However, the New York Court of Appeals's
ruling in Islip disposes of the inquiry easily. Recall that the Court
of Appeals contrasted the adult-use zoning ordinance at issue in
Islip with the District Attorney's decision to close a bookstore in
Arcara by noting that while the District Attorney could have pur-
sued direct and less drastic remedies against the bookstore (such as
arresting patrons who engaged in unlawful sexual activity on the
premises), Islip's problem with the secondary impacts of adult uses
was not remediable through such direct action. Indeed, the Islip
court found specifically that "the Town's use of its zoning powers
was the most appropriate means" through which to address the
secondary impacts,153 and found that where adult establishments
were left with "ample space" not "unduly restrict[ed] ... to limited
or unsuitable areas" of the Town, the ordinance was not susceptible
to judicial reconsideration. 54 Certainly 11% of the property within
New York City-discounting sites that lack proper infrastructure
or are unlikely to become available for other reasons-constitutes
ample space. And in light of the fact that a considerable portion of
that space is located in central commercial or abutting manufactur-
ing districts, it cannot fairly be argued that this space is unsuitable.
The adult-use amendments thus satisfy the heightened require-
ments of the New York State constitution.
150. Crotty Memorandum, supra note 143, at 11.
151. Id. at 6.
152. Islip, 73 N.Y.2d at 558, 540 N.E.2d at 222, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 146.




The adult-use amendments constitute the culmination of almost
twenty years of effort to combat and control the adverse secondary
impacts of adult entertainment establishments. During the lengthy
public hearing process that preceded their enactment, the adult-use
amendments were debated vigorously, with both the City Planning
Commission and City Council concluding in the end that the
amendments would serve the city well by eliminating the present
concentrations of adult uses and ensuring that they continue to op-
erate only in areas where their impacts will no longer undermine
the vitality of local commercial strips and residential communities.
Those whose view failed to carry the day in the political arena
have promised to continue the battle in court. However, it is clear
that the adult-use amendments were developed in a reasoned and
careful manner, designed not to suppress speech and sexually-ex-
plicit conduct but to protect communities from the adverse secon-
dary impacts described above. More importantly, it is clear that
the amendments were drafted with a view toward satisfying the
straightforward criteria developed by the federal and state courts.
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